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BRT Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) is a relatively new mode with a wide range of applications 
that are still not well understood. Its explosive growth in developing and developed countries has 
increased its exposure but has led to mostly experimental implementation with mixed results. 
Therefore, better understanding about the reasons behind BRT implementation success and 
shortcomings is needed. The objective of this thesis is to evaluate the state of BRT planning 
under different contexts by assessing how background theory and practical implementation of 
BRT systems compare. The main analysis methods are comprised of a critical literature review 
and a case study approach. 
The thesis begins with a literature review of the caracteristics of BRT systems and how 
these relate to performance in terms of operations, co t, and sustainability, as well as some 
findings about its implementation. Chapter 3 then rviews the major planning guidelines for the 
US and for developing countries, compares them to find common ground, and contrasts their 
scope and methods. These guidelines were found to be a major step forward in planning but still 
suffer from regional bias and the lack of a sounder th oretical framework. 
Before initiating the case studies, an overview of the state of the mode worldwide as 
compared to rail transit was performed in order to put things into perspective. This overview 
looked at the number of systems in the world, as well as their extent and ridership. BRT was 
found to be a rapidly growing mode, especially in Latin America and Asia, but the levels of 
ridership were much lower for developed countries, as expected. From all these systems, a pool 
of 20 that represent the most well known, established and arguably successful systems was 
chosen. This included systems in Western Europe, East Asia, Australia, and the Americas in 
developed and developed countries alike. Finally, the list was narrowed down 13 case studies 
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using a BRT scoring framework and selection criteria developed by the author that is based on 
the review of Chapter 2. This list represents system  in United States, Canada, Australia, 
Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, and Ecuador, and was chosen for an in-depth analysis and evaluation.  
 This evaluation was first performed through a qualitative perspective. This approach 
classifies BRT systems by characteristics and assesse  the relationship between their 
implementation and performance using the criteria defined in the literature. This analysis found 
profound differences in the conception, application, a d performance of BRT, which are related 
to historic, economic, and institutional reasons. However, the common denominator was strong 
ridership with respect to previous modes and competitive costs (except Boston), on the 
“positive” side, and rushed, incomplete implementation on the “negative”. Aside from system 
elements, which have a large effect on performance, th  most significant aspects affecting 
performance were the service pattern and integration strategies. This analysis did not find 
particularly difference in benefits between the different fare and subsidy structures used, 
although it is well known that all systems have a superior scheme to that of unregulated 
transport, and that over-subsidization leads to increasing inefficiencies.  
 Quantitative methods build upon the previous analysis to more precisely assess their 
performance from both the users' and the transit providers' perspectives through application of 
traditional and novel key performance indicators (KPI). This method allowed comparing systems 
more directly and finding enormous differences in operational and cost performance. However, 
some of these differences do not appear to arise from a particular context, but rather from a 
different application of BRT components.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION. 
 
 
Developing sustainable transportation strategies has become a major focus of many cities around 
the world. Such strategies can range from improved p estrian and bicycle infrastructure to 
investing in metropolitan rail systems. In major cities, where longer distance, high capacity 
services are necessary, city officials often debate the merits and costs of rail systems versus bus 
services. Each has its own advantages given specific context, with rail systems usually providing 
higher capacity, higher speed service, but often at much higher costs. Over the past two decades, 
bus rapid transit (BRT) has emerged as a major alten tive to a rail versus bus debate. Although 
BRT systems are found in cities throughout the world, their greatest success has occurred in 
developing countries, where people demand a high quality transit system without having to pay 
the high price of heavy rail, a lifelong dream for many developing countries unable to afford 
large scale infrastructure development. For these urban centers, BRT has become, in roughly 10 
years, the alternative choice for mass, yet affordable nd quick-to-implement, transit. It portrays 
a different picture of the role that buses can play in public transportation, an echelon above what 
regular bus service offers, entering a realm traditionally reserved for rail-based transit.  
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the success and failure of BRT systems around the 
world, to identify what is necessary to make BRT systems an important component of an urban 







Bus Rapid Transit is a relatively new concept that still suffers from ambiguous definitions. 
Before the turn of the century, only isolated cases uch as Curitiba (Brazil),  Ottawa (Canada) 
and later Adelaide (Australia), among a few others, p esented early forms of a distinctive, bus 
based-system that exhibited a higher degree of reliability and versatility than that of express 
buses in urban corridors. However, it was in the lat 1990’s, that a new wave of systems in Quito 
(Ecuador) and Bogotá (Colombia), which based their d sign on Curitiba’s system, came to form 
what is known as the Latin American BRT model, having a set of common technical, financial 
and institutional characteristics. This model has been emulated recently in developing countries 
like China and India, and also in the United States. Given the different cultural, economic, and 
political contexts of these countries, new experience has been gained on the potential and 
flexibility of BRT, and also on its shortcomings. Despite its taxonomical ambiguity, BRT is now 
recognized worldwide as a separate mode of transportation with unique characteristics. 
BRT has often been misunderstood because it has been misapplied. Even if only elements of a 
fully featured BRT have been implemented, its ‘upscale’ name is almost always used not only 
due to taxonomical confusion, but for its higher marketability compared its “inferior cousins” ( 
“busways” or “bus improvements”). Such misunderstandings trouble academics and practitioners 
alike, and can give the wrong impression to the general public. Most people do not know the 
characteristics of BRT and generally underestimate th  system’s ability to transport high 
passenger demand with a reliable and comfortable service. A first step in this study is to provide 
an adequate definition for Bus Rapid Transit, and to relate existing systems to this definition. 
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The relatively recent development of BRT systems that most of the academic literature and 
planning guidance has been written during the last decade. Most studies have investigated the 
characteristics of BRT and how it compares with other modes in terms of cost and 
implementation. Examples include documents from theF deral Transit Administration 
(Levinson et al, 2003), the Transportation Research Board (Levinson et al., 2007) and the 
Institute for Transportation and Development Policy (Wright and Hook, 2007) that have 
examined costs, transit oriented development (TOD) impacts, service characteristics, planning, 
and implementation. Agencies in the US have seen increased incentives to develop BRT lines via 
the FTA New Starts and Small Starts funding programs, but the overall future for BRT systems 
is still unclear. Close monitoring of continuing exp rience with BRT is crucial to understand the 
boundaries and applicability of BRT systems. Research needs to move on beyond the early case 
studies and focus on the maturing of older systems in Australia, the United States and Latin 
America, the early experience of newer systems in China, India, and Africa. Special emphasis 
needs to be put on how BRT affects its users and the broader community it serves. 
BRT is still a relatively new mode, giving rise to many policy questions. Most importantly, will 
BRT grow to become a more important mode in underdeveloped and developed countries alike, 
or, will it primarily be limited to a niche market? In many ways, it may be too early to answer 
this question, as few BRT systems have come of age,when true lifecycle costs can be 
determined. Nonetheless, there is preliminary performance and financial data that show the 
current state of the mode and at provide some insight into its future.  
If BRTs evolve to emulate rail transit in performance and appearance, and provide an advantage 
in costs, public perception could become very favorble. Such parameters could affect ridership 
and system design. Having this in mind, this thesis will examine the full spectrum of BRT 
4 
 
services using the state of the art in research and performance (international case studies), in 
order to determine the reasons behind BRT success and failure This goal translates into the 
following tasks, no particular order: 
1. Describe the characteristics of BRT systems, evaluate different definitions of BRT and 
determine the characteristics that make up these definitions. This is based on both a 
literature review of reports such as Characteristics of Bus Rapid Transit for Decision 
Making (CBRT: Díaz et al., 2009), and the TCRP Report on Bus Rapid Transit, vols. 1 
and 2, (TCRP report 100: Levinson et al., 2003) as well as other research that focused on 
the same objective. Characteristics are also observed through a case study approach, since 
they are also important to describe findings not previously observed in the literature. 
2. Assess the relative importance of these characteristics and determine their interactions 
and implications. While basic characteristics can be easily determined and do not change 
rapidly, the role that each one plays independently and the positive and negative 
synergies are still not completely understood. A rating system that helps categorize 
different BRT systems should be developed. Important progress has been made in the 
literature in this aspect since 2004, but is has not been sufficient. To achieve this goal, a 
study of recent systems is undertaken, as many are still teaching us different ways of 
designing and implementing BRT systems; some performing as expected, some even 
more successful, and others underperforming. Performance will be assessed using both 
the transit agency and user perspectives. 
3. Develop recommendations for planning, design and imple entation, focusing on the key 
elements to stress under specific situations. This will be done not merely from an 
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engineering perspective, but taking into account the financial and social environment in 
which the BRT service will operate. The TCRP Bus Rapid Transit Practitioner’ Guide 
(TCRP 118: Levinson et al., 2007), the CBRT (Díaz et al., 2009) and the BRT Planning 
Guide (Wright and Hook, 2007) offer many recommendations, but a synthesis combined 
with innovative analyses, could prove highly useful. One main outcome expected from 
this step is to come up with a way to evaluate a current system and suggest improvements 
that do not rely only on expertise. In a similar fashion, using the same principles to 
suggest the best design alternatives based on context would maximize BRTs’ potential 
and drastically reduce inappropriate applications. 
As part of this research, some specific questions are addressed in qualitative and 
quantitative ways: 
• How can success be measured? Performance measures, ch as capacity, 
coverage, productivity, dwell times, headways? Cost/benefit? What about service 
quality, ridership, equity, popularity, image? What is the time span for its 
measurement and assessment?  
• Why are BRTs more successful in some places than others? 
• For this level of success, how much can be attributed o design?  To 
implementation? Political, community and governmental structure involvement? 
Ownership structure? Wealth and socio-economic structu e (e.g. value of time)? 
Culture? How do these vary across the world? Along these lines, which reasons 
for success or failure can be described as systemic or circumstantial? 
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• What is the relationship between cost and success? I  there a variable 
relationship? Is it possible to estimate marginal benefit with respect to investment 
(e.g. adding a new feature)? 
• BRT is touted as the best transit solution for developing countries. What about 
developed countries? Aside from operating cost differentials, institutional aspects 
are important factors. For example, how effective has the federal initiative to 
promote and support BRTs in the US been? How do these vary in other countries 
as well? 
• Will BRT be able to gain widespread recognition and status as a serious 
alternative/complement to both heavy rail transit (HRT) and light rail transit 
(LRT) services?  What lessons do cities like Curitiba and Bogotá have in this 
regard? 
• With respect to the recent proliferation of BRTs all over the world, how of this 
phenomenon can be attributed to ‘success’ (cost and performance), its promoters 
(consultants, academia, INGOs), governmental economic support, or just being 
‘new’?  Is there any evidence of massive ‘copy/paste’ designs and inappropriate 
implementation in developing countries? What irrepaable damage could that 
cause to the future inclusion of BRTs in other developing and developed countries 
when this initial success and marketing wave is over? 
• For cities planned mostly for cars, such as Miami, Houston and Atlanta, how can 
BRTs work more effectively? How much investment would have to be made to 
make the current infrastructure more accessible to transit and BRT-friendly? 
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Feeder services are crucial for high speed BRTs. How w uld the feeder system 
work in such cities? 
• What about the cultural aspects of buses as an everyday transit option? Are they 
seen as being much inferior to rail by prospective us rs? Would a large publicity 
campaign be needed to change people’s minds with regard to this, or should 
performance speak for itself? 
• Does BRT, compared to other systems, have advantages, not just in performance 
vs. cost of investment, but with ownership structure compared to other systems, 
e.g., being more conductive to public/private financing? What added complexities 
would there be in cities with previous HRT systems (Sao Paulo, Mexico, Boston) 
compared to cities with no previous rapid mass transit (Bogotá, Curitiba)?  
Not all of these questions will be completely answered nor will all answers be considered 
satisfactory. But the goal of this study is to gain  much better understanding of BRT 
applications worldwide. The challenge really should not be about modes, as they tend to 
converge with advances in technology. It is about finding flexible ways to implement 
sustainable transportation that makes sense for particul  urban contexts. 
1.2. Thesis Organization 
 
The next Chapter describes the characteristics of BRT as examined in the current literature, 
while Chapter 3 explores current best practices for BRT planning. Chapter 4 analyses the state of 
the practice in BRT implementation through various lenses, relates it to best practices, and 










TCRP Report 118: Bus Rapid Transit Practitioner’s Guide (Levinson et al., 2007) defines BRT 
as “…an integrated system of features, services, and menities that improves the speed, 
reliability, and identity of bus transit”. Along the same lines, Levinson et al. (2003) define it as 
“A flexible, high performance rapid transit mode that combines a variety of physical, operating 
and system elements into a permanently integrated system with a quality image and unique 
identity”. The Bus Rapid Transit Planning Guide (Wright and Hook, 2007) defines BRT as a 
“high-quality bus-based transit system that delivers fast, comfortable, and cost-effective urban 
mobility through the provision of segregated right-of-way infrastructure, rapid and frequent 
operation, and excellence in marketing and customer service”. Of these definitions, the most 
satisfactory (and most recent in print) is the one provided by the TCRP Report 118, since it 
specifies BRT as being bus-based and relates service characteristics to performance. The other 
definitions either do not mention buses or are too subjective. While the mentioning of buses as 
part of the BRT definition might seem nitpicky, it is still needed to specify the type of vehicle 
used and the operating characteristics that directly relate to its attractiveness as a transportation 
mode. And while cost-effectiveness is one of the main advantages of most BRT systems, 
especially in the developing world, it is not a defining characteristic per se; similarly, excellence 
in marketing and customer service should apply to any transit mode, not just to BRT. 
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The literature has also offered various characteristics of the BRT system (Wright, 2004), 
especially after the Transmilenio system in Bogotá broke some paradigms and set new trends.  
The main elements that make up a BRT system are:  running ways, stations, vehicles, fare 
collection, ITS, service and operations plan, and branding elements (FTA, 2009). The degree of 
advancement in each element and the way they are integrated determine the bus transit 
performance levels achieved. In Bogotá, for example, busways were implemented prior to the 
Transmilenio system and the results were better opeations in a mixed traffic environment, but 
did not come close to Transmilenio’s numbers and quality. A novel to approach to system 
characterization was offered by Hoffman and Cain (2008), who, instead of trying to define BRT 
as a single mode meeting some specific characteristics, ubdivided the system into “Quickways“ 
(e.g. in Bogotá, Ottawa, and Brisbane), and “Light Rail Lite” (Los Angeles, Miami). Defining 
these major ‘submodes’ of BRT was important because it helped understand the prevailing 
differences in philosophy and application of these systems between the United States and the rest 
of the world, and the impacts the different systems ight have in future application and 
ridership. In practice, however, it may become increasingly difficult to characterize a new BRT 
system of being of one or another type. In light of his, the ITDP Planning Guide (2007) clearly 
distinguishes between BRT (e.g. Metrobús)1 and fully featured BRT (e.g. Transmilenio), and 
puts both in a bus transit continuum.  Providing a set of characteristics with different levels of 
BRT implies a qualitative continuum helpful to the practitioner. 
 
The literature also lacks a systematic definition of BRT that includes a quantitative component. 
While there will always be a ‘gray area’ when defining a mode, it is important for decision-
                                                      
1
 This document was printed when Metrobús had recently opened, had only one line (Insurgentes), and lacked 
many features (Hidalgo, 2008). Now, only an echelon behind Transmilenio in terms of throughput (no overtaking 
lanes at stations), in could be included among the exclusive group of fully featured BRTs. 
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making purposes to establish quantifiable measures that relate system characteristics to 
performance, even if the latter is context dependent. A classification method for BRT in Chapter 






The major advantage BRT systems have over other transi  lternatives designed to serve the 
same market is its higher cost-effectiveness. Despit  the arguments made by advocacy groups 
such as lighrailnow.org, which claim the cost advantages are not real even in the short term, the 
literature generally agrees that there is a big difference in capital cost with respect to light rail 
transit (LRT) and an order of magnitude cost savings with respect to heavy rail transit (HRT), 
which also has higher operations and maintenance (O&M) costs on average (Zhang, 2009). GAO 
(2001) found capital cost advantages compared to rail, but mixed results when comparing 
operational costs. This study only considered US systems (many of which could not be 
considered ‘true’ BRT by a strict definition) and predated newer, more BRT-like projects. 
However, there is no new evidence that suggests a different trend, despite outliers such as the 
Boston Silver Line-Waterfront (this one in terms of capital cost), a case study in this thesis. 
Bruun (2005), using parametric cost functions, and Hess et al. (2005), segmenting BRT by 3 
types, both suggest slightly higher operating costs for BRT when compared to rail service as 
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capacity increases past a threshold2, but operating costs are consistently lower than regular bus 
service, due to greater efficiency in service. 
It is important to point out that these and other similar studies are based on US-specific values 
coming from the national transit database (NTD), which still does not consider BRT as a distinct 
mode. Consequently, the costs tend to reflect what is considered “Bus Improvements”3, while 
basing higher-end options on hypothetical values.  These are the same values used by consultants 
and transit agencies nationwide, so a practitioner should be cautious when using reference values 
even in a pre-feasibility planning phase. It would be more appropriate to use component values 
such as those suggested by Wright and Hook (2007) and adjust them based on local market 
conditions.  
However, most recently, researchers have been creating more sophisticated spatial models that 
remove modal bias and take into account a more comprehensive economic framework, while 
using unbiased parameter estimates. Daganzo (2009) modelled a typical city’s network and 
treated public transport a logistics problem. He found that high quality BRT was more 
competitive than the car unless density and demand were too low, and always more competitive 
than other modes as long as there is enough road space to fit it. The results are being applied to 
Barcelona. Hensher (2010) applied data from Australian systems4 to a user and agency cost 
theoretical model and showed that BRT outperform all rail modes unless speed differentials were 
significant. To showcase cost advantages beyond jurisdiction-specific boundaries, Hidalgo 
(2005), using an adjusted international average, showed a present value cost favoring BRT 
                                                      
2
 This study uses a robust methodology but bases LRT’s benefits on variable size trains to accommodate higher 
capacities with lower labor costs. However, this scenario does not consider user costs or network characteristics 
present in real life transportation systems. 
3
 This submodal denomination applies to traditional bus service with marginal improved operations, such as TSP or 
GPS tracking. 
4
 This data includes higher crew cost per vehicle for LRT. 
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investments for high capacities. This study was significant because it attempted to normalize 
performance across modes and performed a lifecycle ost comparison. However, since the origin 
of these costs is not reported, it is difficult to determine if any system, especially in the 
developed world, would be represented by this average value. In the most comprehensive study 
of BRT characteristics relating to performance to date, Hensher and Golob (2008) took 44 
systems (creating dummies for ultra-expensive system  like Boston’s) and developed a statistical 
analysis, identifying key variables related to infrastructure cost performance. Infrastructure costs 
were found to be most dependent on traffic signal priority (TSP) improvements and number of 
terminals, with no significant influence on location r level of economic development. In this 
case, then Light Rail Lite type systems could be costlier than “Quickways” like Transmileno, or 
at least much less cost-effective than those in Brisbane. It is important to note that recently 
planned systems in the US are higher investment levels than previous ones on average and that 
the FTA is supporting this trend (Cain et al, 2006).  
However, operational costs were not part of the study. Because the difference between 
operational costs in developed versus developing countries could help explain the varying 
success across the globe, there is a need to perform a comparative study of all types of costs for 
all regions. The major hurdle in developing this type of research is the availability and reliability 
of data, especially in developing countries. Also, the lag between data collection by the agency 
and publication of results during a fast paced imple entation may render results obsolete 
especially since much innovation is going on technially and financially. A universal, ‘real-time’ 
database would not erase these shortcomings, especially in the short term, but would be a step 




Another topic mentioned in the literature cost effectiveness of both network expansion and 
technical improvements. TCRP Report 118 (Levinson et al., 2007) showed a positive linear 
relationship between investment and performance, and provided for cost effectiveness of 
different elements. This study is the only one of its kind and helps practitioners follow a 
procedure for determining what they should include in their design. However, its results are 
based on regression using average values so it doesn t take into account the order of 





Transmilenio (Bogotá) has shown that BRT can even surpass LRT systems in capacity, and rival 
most HRTs around the world as well5. The main reason behind this unforeseen performance (for 
a pre-BRT reference, read Vuchic (1992)) was the introduction of passing lanes in the vicinity of 
all stations, allowing for different types of routes that optimize passenger throughput. This 
configuration exponentially increases capacity and is much easier to implement than its rail 
counterpart. If combined with higher capacity buses and optimized station design, the theoretical 
limit for BRT capacity could extend beyond 50.000 pax/hr/dir without compromising reliability 
(SDG, 2007), a value usually achievable only by high investment moving block HRT systems. 
With this type of design, BRT can also achieve high commercial speeds with greater station 
density and shorter headways. Even if typical speeds have been found to be in a range lower than 
LRT and HRT, the difference is less due to technical inferiority (especially when compared to 
LRT), than the tradeoff between speed and accessibility (Hook and Wright, 2007). For example, 
                                                      
5
Hook and Wright, 2007.ITDP Planning Guide Appendix. Volume = 45.000 pax/dir-hr 
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the O-Bahn in Adelaide has speeds that rival most rail systems but also higher average station 
spacing than any other BRT in the world.  
 
A third performance characteristic commonly mentioned in the literature is route flexibility and 
network connectivity. Hensher (2007), mentions network size and service coverage as the main 
reason for the mode’s potential. This is why, even with high station density, travel time remains 
competitive with faster systems, as transfers are reduced (FTA, 2009). In terms of comfort, no 
definitive study has been made that quantifies this c aracteristic for high-speed BRT systems for 




BRT is widely considered to have considerably faster implementation times (Levinson, 2003; 
Ardila, 2004), and this reduces investment risk, a main component in economic sustainability.  
Hensher (2007) finds BRT aligned with sustainability and value of money principles after 
reviewing successful cases in the Americas and Australia. If relative high performance comes at 
a fraction of the cost of comparable rail systems and with a possibility of no direct operational 
subsidy, then the system has the potential of being more economically sustainable than 
otherwise. This is an argument that the World Bank d NGOs like EMBARQ and ITDP use to 
justify the implementation of BRT systems, especially in developing countries6. Major efforts are 
focused on innovative finance using PPPs in order to push BRT projects closer towards financial 
feasibility. While the upfront costs have been studied exhaustively, the only complete economic 
                                                      
6
A noteworthy case in the US was EMBARQ’s response to the governor of Maryland’s modal decision on the Purple 
Line based on the alternatives analysis submitted to the FTA. 
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evaluation of these systems that has been published (albeit not in an international peer reviewed 
journal) is a study by Echeverry et al. (2004) which analyses Transmilenio in terms of its overall 
impact in the city of Bogotá. While Peñalosa (2005) and Ardila (2007) found inconsistencies in 
this evaluation, it serves as an example of the typof evaluation should be attempted for many 
systems in a mature stage of operations. The most important contribution of this study was to 
look at the effects on Transmilenio on the city as a whole and not just the corridor it ran on. 
Since it displaced old routes to other corridors, and the old buses were not retired, the overall 
congestion and pollution benefits obtained were much lower than expected. The high 
infrastructure costs of subsequent phases must also reduce the B/C ratio significantly.  
 
The environmental aspect is seen as a weaker point of BRT systems since the average American 
system sees higher emissions than similarly aged and performing LRT (Puchalsky, 2006). The 
main reason behind this result is that most systems still use high sulfur diesel, which usually, 
emits more than electricity in SO2 and PM2.5. Since these are mobile, urban emissions, not only 
could they affect a greater part of the population more directly, but are perceived as worst even 
when their levels are lower than those in electricity generation plants. Despite the industry 
having shown major improvements in efficiency and cleaner fuels in the last decade, only until 
recently have the larger systems in developing countries experimented with hybrid-electric buses 
and low-sulfur diesel. This step is significant since research done by (Vincent and Walsh, 2003; 
Vincent and Callahan, 2007) determines the potential of BRT to be effectively cleaner than rail 
technologies once cleaner fuels and hybrid technologies are generally adopted. When part of this 
debate, researchers must remember that BRT does not have a set fuel type behind it; the obvious 
technologies it could use in the future, such as hydrogen, have already been tested. Perhaps, even 
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fully electrical vehicles could be used when the technology permits and the electricity generation 
becomes cleaner. This could virtually erase the gap in vehicle emissions it has with LRT, its 
main ‘rival’. 
 
Systems in developing countries vary greatly in terms of fuel quality and emissions but are 
generally dirtier per mile travelled than in developed countries. Sepulveda (2007) explores this 
when noting that an expanded Transmilenio (TM) bus fleet with the current diesel quality would 
increase pollution significantly. However, since throughput is much higher, the impact per capita 
is not as high as in most American systems. Also, due to the positive impacts of systems like 
Transmilenio and Metrobús (which uses LS Diesel), they have received millions of dollars for 
carbon reduction through Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) programs, which are available 
for developing countries. These findings show that t e evaluation of transit systems still lacks 
comprehensiveness. No article in print has done a comparison in terms of sustainability7, either 
within or across modes, so many questions are left unanswered. Would investing in potentially 
high cost cleaner technologies limit some of its cot advantages? This is difficult to determine 
with certainty, as it is difficult to estimate the costs of the new technology when first being 
implemented. Also, in countries with private service provision, how the implementation of newer 
technologies would come into play with private operato s would work is something to wait and 
see. Nonetheless, it is probable that these buses will quickly equate in price and reliability to 
petroleum based buses. Overall, while bus systems with current mainstream technology can have 
a disadvantage with respect to rail depending on the w ere electricity is produced, there is no big 
enough advantage that warrants a modal supremacy in this area. 
                                                      
7
 For a first step in an evaluation in terms of sustainability for bus systems under similar contexts, refer to Campo 






Implementation greatly differs between the United States, Latin America, and Asia. The most 
successful BRT implementation model so far has been th  Latin American model (Hidalgo, 
2008) due to the strategies taken to overcome the prevailing bus system and the relative ease 
with which a strong government can act (Ardila, 2004). ‘Regulated competition for the market’, 
a concept that describes a PPP with a few bus owning and operating companies, a public agency 
overseeing operations and setting the rules, and independent fare collection and revenue 
distribution, has been replicated in many countries in Latin America and has been relatively 
successful at least in the short term (Ardila, 2007). This organizational structure worked in 
Bogotá and other cities mostly because it was design d to legally displace the old bus and 
inefficient service from the BRT corridors (Hidalgo and Sandoval, 2003) through restricted 
negotiation, as the bigger unregulated bus companies were invited to join the bid process.  This 
selective contracting approach proved to be a smart ove to get the Transmilenio going quickly, 
but it also could be a reason why scrapping old buses has not been that successful (Ardila, 2007). 
Mexico City with its newer system, Metrobús, has a just slightly different structure in that the 
public agency also operates buses, but has been much ore successful in removing the displaced 
buses from the city streets (CTS, 2009). No thorough analysis has been made on the topic. 
Due to similar prevailing service provisions, in Southeast Asia and India similar strategies have 
been tried but they have not been as successful becaus  the political and cultural climate there is 
different (Hidalgo, 2008). Implementation in those countries, especially in India, has been rushed 
and many systems could not be considered BRT during their first years of operations. The 
tendency, however, is that through increased interna io al cooperation and feedback from past 
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failures, newer systems will correct some of the implementation mistakes (Hidalgo, 2008b). The 
results are yet to be seen and it would take a couple of years for new findings to be published. 
In the United States, the situation is different in hat much transit is publicly owned and operated. 
Here, the FTA (with its motto ‘Think Rail, Do Bus’) has been investigating and supporting 
different BRT experiments in the country, funding new projects under the New Starts and Small 
Starts programs. The efforts have produced systems as different as the Boston Silver Line and 
the LA Orange Line. Private organizations such as the National Bus Rapid Transit Institute 
(NBRTI) and GoBRT, affiliated with research universities, have collaborated in understanding 
and advocating for quick implementation.  
Results from this collaboration has produced studies lik  that of Cain et al. (2008), which looked 
at the possibilities of implementing a Transmilenio-style system in the United States. This 
research acknowledges the prevalence of the LRL concept in the United States and identifies the 
barriers and opportunities of implementing a true BRT system instead of just a simple route 
along a line. In this study, it was found that while bus transit in the US suffers from lack of non-
captive ridership, unattractiveness to private investors, and little understanding among decision 
makers when compared to Latin America, it could also benefit from growing support for more 
cost-effective options and more rigorous technical studies.  
As suggested by these articles, the institutional fr mework is the main barrier to replicate a 
successful model from overseas, but it does not prevent high quality and successful systems to be 
implemented. The second aspect to be studied regardin  implementation success is the 
relationship of BRT network and land use. A handful of studies, of which Rodriguez and Mojica 
(2009) is the most recent, look at BRT impacts on land values. They suggest significant property 
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appreciation benefitting from increased connectivity due to system expansion. However, the 
relationship between these benefits and equitable service quality has yet to be established. 
 
2.3. Concluding remarks 
 
 
Previous research about characteristics of BRT systems and their relationship to performance has 
shown that BRT is indeed a distinct mode with unique component characteristics and service that 
can make it valuable and successful in many countries. The literature reviewed describes the 
service, environmental, and implementation characteistics of BRT system that make it unique 
and appealing. However, research specifically lacks a better understanding of how 
implementation plays a role in the relationship between characteristics and performance. This 
thesis will build upon this relatively unexplored relationship regarding BRT systems planning. 










As discussed in the previous chapter, the characteristics of Bus Rapid Transit have been widely 
studied. Yet it has been only recently that policy-oriented research was done and planning 
guidelines were developed for this mode. These documents are a first attempt to link the 
observed aspects of BRT to best practices in system d velopment. Application of their 
recommendations is supposed to improve the way BRT systems are planned and implemented. 
Decision-making based on guidelines is important sice so many systems around the world are 
currently in planning and phased implementation. The more that BRT systems learn from 
previous experience, the better their use of scarce resources and the credibility of the mode.   
This chapter looks in depth at the most important research on BRT planning, and makes the case 
for a synthesis of information that can be used by newer systems, incorporating state-of-the-
practice analysis approaches. For congruency with a major theme of this thesis, I stress the 
importance of considering context within planning and implementation. 




The literature (Wright and Hook, 2007; Levinson et. al, 2007) makes it clear that practitioners 
must first understand the constituent parts of BRT systems and keep them in mind throughout the 
project. Although not openly stating it, experts agree that the more BRT differentiates itself from 
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regular bus service (RBS), the higher the chances of implementation success. This “growing 
apart” from standard incremental bus service improvements in planning is considered one of the 
main characteristics that differentiate highly successful projects (e.g., RIT (Curitiba, Brazil), 
Transmilenio (Bogotá, Colombia) from less successful ones (e.g.TransJakarta (Jakarta, 
Indonesia). However, knowing the basic BRT distinctive elements and their relationship to 
performance is not enough to plan appropriately. For transit planners to achieve this level of 
success without making the mistake of replicating systems seen elsewhere, planning should 
generally follow a systematic approach. The ITDP Guide summarizes the following planning 
steps, which will be used in this thesis, complemented with other sources.  
First, project preparation would include: 
• Initiation: Look for local political leadership. 
• Modal technology: Pick a desired technology based on cost-effectiveness, ease of 
implementation, and overall impacts. 
• Project setup: 
o Select an interdisciplinary project team based on expert consultants and local 
government officials.  
o Select the funding sources and design financing mechanisms. 
o Set the scope of the project large enough to start with financially sustainable 
ridership but not too large as to compromise effectiv  implementation. 
• Demand Analysis: Depending on the data availability and the budget, use either a quick 
assessment method or a full transportation network model. 
• Corridor selection: 
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o Chose an alignment based on demand, physical limitat ons, network advantages, 
costs, implementation, politics, and social equity.  
o Do not be limited by spatial constraints. One of the main strengths of BRT is that 
it can adapt to a variety of conditions. 
• Communications: 
o Perform an inclusive stakeholder analysis.  
o Initiate a public participation process. 
This first step is standard for any type of transit planning. The authors include the modal 
technology sections possibly to avoid portraying a modal bias, yet a BRT guide must assume that 
the bus alternative has been chosen over its rail counterpart. This discussion then helps to 
approach the cost and capacity advantages of BRT over ther modes. The comparison is 
valuable, but since it only provides ranges for aver g  costs and capacity, readers could be 
mislead into overestimating BRT’s relative benefits. A capacity-over-capital cost ratio should be 
provided so that practitioners can understand what level of investment is required to achieve a 
certain level of capacity and speed. The TCRP Report 118: BRT Practitioners’ Guide (Levinson 
et al., 2007) does not do exactly this, but it includes a relationship between performance 
(ridership and travel time savings) and cost (component and total). It also mentions that despite 
BRT in the US usually costing less than comparable LRT investments, it should be studied for 
funding in the same way as rail alternatives (pg.2.3)  Funding programs in the US range from 
“Bus Corridor Improvements” to “New Starts”, although a true BRT system usually needs more 
than the $25 million dollar limit for the former. In the rest of the world, financing varies 
significantly (usually is a mix of international development bank loans, and a combination of 
national and local capital),so capital funding details re not discussed here. 
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Regarding a demand analysis, Wright and Hook (2007) give examples of the four levels of 
modeling used, but Levinson et al. (2007) do a much better job at explaining a quick assessment 
method by using ridership elasticities.  
The next major step is operational design. Its main components are: 
• Network and service design:  
o Choose either a closed (restricted to a set of operators under equal rules with 
centralized supervision) or open (much more relaxed entry barriers in using 
infrastructure) system. 
o Choose between a trunk-feeder or a direct services system, based on accessibility 
needs, overall travel times, and costs. 
o Take advantage of the high route permutation capacity of BRT systems. 
• System capacity and speed:  
o Capacity has to be enough to cope with peak demand and speed has to be 
competitive with alternative modes. 
o Both depend on a range of factors but are greatly determined by busway design 
(one or more lanes, intersection design), vehicle design (size, multiple doorways, 
boarding level), and station design (off-board fare collection, spacing, stopping 
bays). 
 
• Intersections and signal control:  
o Focus on turning restrictions, especially in developing countries. 
o Chose an appropriate location for a BRT station (in the middle of a road segment 
or at an intersection; on the curbside or on the median), based on passenger 
accessibility, available space, and interaction with cross traffic. 
24 
 
• Customer service: 
o Design the system based on customers’ needs and wants. 
o Do not neglect signage and other forms of customer info mation. 
o Be aware of aesthetics. 
o Make security and cleanliness a priority. 
 
This chapter in the Guide is very detailed in the way it explains how operational decision-making 
affects not only costs and revealed system performance, but also accessibility in its broadest 
social context. This is an important observation since the social implications of corridor selection 
is an important topic explored in this thesis.  
One element of this chapter in the Guide that could be better developed is its treatment of transit 
signal priority (TSP). While Wright and Hook(2007, pp. 313-314) talk about cases in which TSP 
is desired and give a few application examples, the Practicioner’s Guide (Levinson et al. 2007, 
pp. 4.26-32) includes case study and model results, plu  a decision-making framework for its 
implementation. In general, TSP should be implemented where it achieves considerable time 
benefits (such as on congested routes and when stations are located on the far-side or mid-block 
part of a road segment), but it is most widely used in eveloped countries since technology is 
more available and cheaper, intersections tend to be closer together, reducing signal phases is 
less common, and bottlenecks are observed mostly at stations (Lleras, 2007). Recent traffic 
simulation software is expected to become a fundamental tool in operational design.  
The next step is to make this operational design closer to reality by turning to physical design.  




o Chose the right busway building materials. This may seem trivial, and greatly 
depends on market pressures, but it directly affects lifecycle costs and station 
design. 
o Since most BRT systems have surface stations, architectural design must focus on 
temperature and weather issues, and pedestrian-traffic interaction. 
o Most BRT systems require transfer terminals, control centers, large depot areas. 
o Capital costs must be maintained within reasonable ranges for BRT, but never 
compromise the basic elements that make it a distinct mode with respect to RBS. 
The main reason for escalating costs is property acquisition, sometimes a result of 
pressures to maintain auto capacity. Since BRT investm nts are usually expended 
simultaneously with other investments not directly related to the project, direct 
BRT costs must be separated from complementary works. 
• Technology: 
o Bus technology decisions are made in terms of size and propulsion system. While 
size is standard, propulsion technologies are continuously evolving: clean diesel, 
CNG, hybrid-electric, among others, are the most comm n. 
o Fare collection range from smart cards to coin-operated machines. This 
technology does not affect system performance as much as other design aspects 
(even though it may compromise versatility). Therefo , it should be chosen 
mostly for budget limits and ease-of-use. 
o Intelligent transportation systems (ITS), including vehicle control and passenger 




One of the most important topics from the above list is  the high variation in capital costs due to 
property acquisition (e.g., Bogotá’s Transmilenio 3rd phase costing approximately US$20 
million/mile, a high price for a developing country). BRT advocates argue that funding is 
unfairly compromised when these numbers escalate duto the inclusion of external 
improvements into the BRT budget. Nevertheless, it will continue to be an issue, since surface 
systems cannot be expected to achieve high capacities and continue to interact with other modes 
without incurring such costs. This topic is discussed in the next planning step. 
Both major guides mention the advantages and disadvantages of technology in terms of costs and 
user benefits, but none explicitly mention how technology choices can be analyzed in terms of 
lifecycle costs and scalability.  
 
The next major step for BRT planning is integration. Its main components are: 
• Modal integration: 
o Pedestrian access is the most important modal integration aspect and should take 
into account connectivity, accessibility, safety, and security. 
o Integration with other modes, motorized and non-motorized, can greatly increase 
BRT system performance and help reduce direct costs, since these modes can act 
as feeders into the system. 
• Transportation demand management (TDM) and land use: 
o These measures, meant to discourage use of the automobile, should encourage 
increased use of public transit. 
o Land use policies should go hand in hand with BRT development, which has 
shown to be conducive to TOD. 
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Much of this final step of the planning process is often rushed and overlooked, yet it is a 
fundamental aspect of successful transit planning and even more applicable to BRT, given its 
typical integrated/segregated infrastructure. Aside from this guide, which is comprehensive in its 
treatment of accessibility, a good set of guidelines were developed by the World Bank (Rickert, 
2007; Rickert, 2010) that focus on designing adequate accessibility to BRT systems and 
evaluating key issues. These guidelines focus on the developing world, where budget cuts are 
biased towards pedestrian access infrastructure, where public transportation is largely 
unregulated, and where there is usually no legislation or adequate enforcement that protects the 
low income and disadvantaged people. The most important contribution of these guidelines is 
how the whole user experience, from leaving the house to reaching a destination, is accounted 
for in the case of a physically disadvantaged person. For example, even the fare collection 
system should be designed in a way that makes it easy for everybody to use it. Although 
developing nations are the target of World Bank investment, developed nations such as the US 
have a lot to learn from these recommendations, given that multimodal integration is a challenge 
here as well. General accessibility guidelines developed by federal and local governments are 
useful, but a BRT-specific document would come in ha dy for American practitioners. This is 
missing from the Practitioners’ Guide8, surprisingly if you consider its effect on ridership, one of 
the two main topics of the document.  
Integration with modes such as taxis, pedicabs, andbicycles are in the early stages of 
development. There is arguably no BRT system in the world as of yet that can be considered to 
have high marks in this regard. Much of thislack of integration has to do with limited resources 
and cultural disregard for egalitarian safety and comfort, but also because most BRTs are called 
                                                      
8
Throughout the document, classic BRT feature such as level boarding, amenities and image, land development, 
and off board fare collection are mentioned, but there is no direct treatment of accessibility. 
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“systems” while they are still only “lines”. However, since the goal of many cities is to integrate 
their BRT lines with other modes of transport, and the transportation planning community has 
shifted its values from mobility to sustainable accessibility, multimodal integration will likely 
receive further attention in the BRT literature and practice. This topic could be tied to research 
on BRT and TOD, discussed in the previous chapter. 
Regarding land use, while both BRT guides focus on planned TOD policies in the US and 
abroad, these take many decades to implement on a citywide scale through zoning and market 
policies. On the other hand, BRT systems could cover most of the city in a faster time, especially 
in developing countries. Since no other mass transit mode has this fast implementation time, 
BRT could become the main tool to turn urban regions into transit adaptive cities (Cervero, 
1999) by a more natural mechanism. Triggered by effici nt transportation infrastructure, 
standard zoning practices supporting TOD and “livable communities” concepts could advance 
more effectively than otherwise. 
Lastly, the literature makes clear that BRT should be planned along with transportation demand 
management (TDM) strategies, especially in countries that subsidize the internal and external 
costs of auto transportation. Policy recommendations that look to “level the playing field” 
between cars and transit are described comprehensively, based on the work of the Victoria 
Transportation Policy Institute (Littman, 2010). With globally increasing motorization triggering 
problems with cross street traffic at grade level (even with TSP), BRT could lose its comparative 
advantages over other modes in cost and integration flexibility. Such a scenario could hinder the 
successful development of BRT, sustainable transit, and all the positive land use and livability 
benefits it could provide. 
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After integrating the technical aspects of the project, the final step of the pre-implementation 
planning phase is the development of a business plan. This plan, which is concerned mostly with 
the way expenditures are managed, can make a major difference in the success or failure of the 
system. Below I summarize the basic principles for best practices of a BRT business plan in 
developing countries, according to Wright and Hook (2007, pgs. 547-686): 
 
• Business and institutional structure: 
o Traditionally, neither a single public monopoly nor a “free” competitive market 
with many providers has proven to be an efficient way to operate with high 
quality and minimum costs. Competitively-tendered concessions for vehicle 
ownership and operations with strong public oversight allow for enough 
competition for the market but limited competition i the market (Ardila, 2008). 
Transmilenio is a good example of this. 
o Under this scheme, operators are paid by kilometer and not by passenger picked 
up, and further awarded or penalized based on performance. 
o In cases when it is helpful to bring change, the creation of a new agency for the 
BRT system is useful. It is important that this agency operates autonomously over 
planning, infrastructure, and supervision. 
o Direct involvement by a public official (“political champion”) has shown to be a 
catalyst for rapid and successful implementation of BRT systems and is 
recommended. 
• Operational costs and fares: 
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o The goal in the developing world is to operate without subsidies. This means that 
the public sector should not subsidize repayment of capital and operating costs 
(fixed and variable). 
o If vehicles are included in the concession contract, then they can be considered 
operational costs; otherwise, they can be bundled with the rest of the capital 
investment. 
o Fares should be defined technically, based on operational productivity. 
o It is recommended that an independent fare company collect the revenues, thus 
acting as a “trustee” to distribute revenues based on contractual agreements. 
• Financing: 
o The relative low-cost characteristic of BRT makes it within reach of most cities 
wishing to implement it, so even many developing cities do not require large 
amounts of resources from external sources (e.g. World Bank, IADB). 
o The local match generally comes from vehicle ownership fees, gas taxes, value 
capture, and parking fees. Infrastructure PPPs are also an option, but they bring an 
additional complexity and have not been as successful a  expected. 
• Marketing: 
o The negative stigma associated to buses is a challenge but also an opportunity for 
BRT planners to sell change by using modern branding strategies, which start by 
attractive names and logos. 
o The media should be used to the planner’s advantage to get to the public, 
highlighting BRT strengths and reminding them of the weaknesses of the old 
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system that BRT is replacing. Direct community outreach is a complementary 
mechanism as part of the communication strategy.  
The structure of this step, as described above, is the base for the relatively successful (at least in 
the short term) Latin American post-Transmilenio model. However, in recent years there have 
been issues regarding the replication of this structu e in the developing world, which will be 
explored later in this thesis. Also, many of the recommendations do not apply that well to the US 
and much of the developed world, despite the lessons these countries can learn from developing 
nations.  
The generalized ownership structure of public transit provision by single public agencies 
operating over a jurisdiction is different around the world. These agencies subcontract some 
services but largely own and operate the fleet, and their main challenge is to overcome inter-
jurisdictional barriers when metro areas grow beyond a political entity. This configuration leads 
to a monopolistic situation, which in theory is justified by economies of scale, but at the same 
time may lead to high inefficiencies. Operating subsidies are very high due to many structural 
reasons (not necessarily monopolistic inefficiency) so there is no realistic near term possibility of 
eliminating them, just reducing them as much as posible.  
Based on recent experience, BRT planners in Latin America are now reevaluating the strict rule 
set by them for not allowing non-infrastructure subidies. The challenge is to design mechanisms 
that avoid the negative incentives brought by directly subsidizing operations. An option is to 
allow subsidies for the high cost of capital that some operators face, or to create externality 
capture mechanisms that help fund operations while not directly rewarding inefficiencies. The 
possibilities are many, and there is no clear answer, since the debate is as political as it is 
32 
 
academic. While traditionally, American economists favored optimal levels of infrastructure 
subsidies and accepted operating subsidies on the grounds of social benefits (Karlaftis and 
McCarthy, 1998), others (Obeng and Sakano, 2008) have found strong inefficiencies in 
productivity that leave no economic argument for any type of subsidy in the presence of slight 
diseconomies of scale. 
In terms of private involvement in operations, varying levels of successful competition for the 
market in transit industries around the world make it difficult to obtain a consensus on whether 
negotiation or competitive tendering is a better way to grant contracts to private operators 
(Wallis et al., 2010). Adelaide (a case study in this t esis) has enjoyed more success through 
negotiation than through competitive tendering, while Bogotá DC and México DF have been 
successful through the latter. In México there have be n experiments that include competition in 
operations from the public agency itself, and negotiati n over a single operator for a new line 
(little barriers of entry were placed for the first phase due to political reasons) as strategies to 
lower costs. 
The independent fare company and trustee handling the revenues was an invention of McKinsey 
and Company for Transmilenio. It makes sense for the objective of transparency, yet the 
independence of fare collection from the overseeing agency may become an unnecessary cost, 
burdening the user where it brings no significant added value. Regarding the fare structure, 
paying strictly by kilometer has proven to be inefficient despite having the effect of de-
incentivizing the “War of the Cent”. This year Curitiba implemented paying operators by 
passenger as well using an undisclosed formula, so this strict recommendation should be 
revaluated citing more thorough research and results from experience.  
33 
 
Marketing BRT has always been important to differentiate it from RBS. In recent years, due to 
the exponential growth of motorcycles in developing countries and stiff competition from 
cheaper, unregulated RBS in cities where BRT remains  minority (as predicted by Lleras 
(2003)), marketing needs to become a bigger priority than it is now in BRT planning. In the US, 
where having a good image applies to all transit and marketing is much more developed, one 
sees even more attractive names, logos, and buses, some of which look very similar to LRT in an 
effort to remove the negative bias toward bus transit (TCRP Report 111, 2006). In spite of 
leading the world in this area, there is very little public education on the characteristics of BRT 
in the US. Legislators and the affected communities tend to be ignorant of what BRT means and 
represents(the LRT choice by the governor of Maryland for the Purple Line despite BRT 
showing better cost efficiency ratings might be an example of this, although political 
considerations certainly played a role in this decision (EMBARQ, 2009)). 
 
3.2.2. Implementation 
Successful implementation requires constant feedback and accountability, which in turn demands 
a monitoring and evaluation plan. Costs and impacts should be centered on the user 
experience, but since not all performance can be measur d from stated feedback, a set of 
measurable indicators and analysis methodologies neds to be developed before the system is in 
operation. The impacts to be evaluated are: 
 
• Traffic: corridor benefits and tradeoff with other modes. 
• Economic: cost effectiveness and benefit-cost analysis (production + employment). 
• Environmental: air pollutants, GHG emissions, waste and noise reduction. 
34 
 
• Social: expropriation, worker displacement, poverty alleviation, crime reduction, safety, 
and intangibles. 
• Urban: urban form 
 
These impact categories are standard for any transportation project, yet  estimating impacts for 
BRT tends to be trickier than for other modes, especially when BRT is part of city-wide bus 
route reorganization such as in Santiago (Chile).  
Positive impacts need to be assessed with no under/over estimating or double counting.  
Currently, most project evaluation criteria separate environmental assessment from economic 
feasibility. Therefore, funding is not as dependent on certain non-economic impacts. 
Nevertheless, when future projects are analyzed in terms of more comprehensive sustainability 
criteria that include both economic and environmental factors, BRT planners should be familiar 
with how they are estimated. 
Based on the methodologies developed for project evaluation, a monitoring and evaluation plan 
based on key performance indicators across all areas should be developed according to the 
Planning Guide. These can be grouped under: 
 
• System performance: mode share, travel time and speed, ridership, among others, fare, 
comfort, among others. 
• Economic: employment, time savings, property values, technological production. 
• Environmental: air pollutants, GHG emissions, and noise levels; ilnesses; number of 
retired buses. 
• Urban: property developments along corridor, quality of public space surveys. 
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• Political: supporting officials and their reelection success. 
While the development of political indicators could be meaningless in practice, some of the 
indicators mentioned above are very useful, yet rarely calculated, monitored, and reported. In 
this area, agencies that have heavy rail as a major mode typically do a much better job than BRT 
agencies. Furthermore, the rail industry has strong benchmarking programs based on key 
performance indicators (KPIs) such as the COMET system, headquartered at the University 
College of London (UCL). Given it is a new mode, BRT advocates have just started to catch up 
and recently launched SIBRT, a benchmarking organization for Latin American BRT agencies 
headed by NGOs, and VRef, a Volvo initiative comprising several universities in Chile, 
Australia, and the UK, as well as NGOs. The National Tr nsit Database (NTD) still does not 
identify BRT as a distinct mode, but that could change soon. Continuous monitoring and 
benchmarking is important not only to a BRT agency and its users, but for the future of BRT 
worldwide. Evolution of BRT as a mode goes faster with benchmarking because it provides its 
practitioners and researchers opportunities to comprehend and innovate. Actually, this thesis 
makes use of key system performance indicators that are useful to assess the state of the practice 
of successful BRT systems. If such benchmarking had been in place at the time of this research, 
analysis could have been much more comprehensive. 
After the evaluation framework is in place, the actu l implementation plan can be executed. 
This plan is similar to the business plan but covers more ground and is more detailed and 
practical. Its major elements for developing countries according to the Planning Guide are the 
following: 
• Choosing and preparing the implementing agency 
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o It is generally recommended for the planning agency (be it new or old) to be the 
same as the operating agency. If not, whichever agency is in charge of 
implementation must be prepared for the required activities. 
o Responsibility for implementation is divided between construction and 
operational aspects. Usually construction is handled by an experienced agency 
(e.g. public works) while operational aspects are dealt with by the BRT agency, 
and coordination is performed by somebody with direct access to the Mayor or 
Governor. The decision should be made based on both technical and political 
criteria. 
o The organizational structure should have, at a minium, departments of planning, 
operations, finance, and administration. 
• Operating contracts 
o These should be completed well before the launch of t e system, giving enough 
time for operators to buy the vehicles. 
o Fare system contracting should ensure no conflicts between the technology 
provider and the operator, and if these are the same company (e.g. through a lump 
sum contract type), then the agency should make sure costs do not escalate. 
 
• Construction 
o Includes the four basic construction steps, from detailed design to maintenance. 
o Includes construction of: busways, stations, terminals and depots, control center 




o The contracting structure should ensure: minimize government’s costs, risk, 
financing cost, delays and transaction costs, coordination problems, and 
substandard construction. The number of contracts should not be too many or too 
few, based on local circumstances. 
o It is important to note that the construction of a system not only affects its 
technical performance but also its image. Therefore, it must be as organized as 
transparent as possible. 
o All stakeholders affected by the construction should be given appropriate 
participation in the process and mitigation strategies should be in place before 
construction begins. 
o Quality and speed should be higher than for standard road projects. 
• Maintenance 
o Vehicle maintenance is the responsibility of the oprators in most cases, but strict 
contractual standards and supervision comes from the overseeing agency. The 
case is similar for ITS equipment. 
o BRT stations, especially their turnstiles, should be functioning at all times, since 
they are small compared to underground transit stations but carry as many 
passengers. 
o Infrastructure maintenance depends on whether therewas a PPP with contractors 
and what longer term quality contracts demand from c ntractors. 
The implementation plan for developing nations’ BRT planning includes many elements 
applicable to all sorts of public transportation projects in developed countries as well. However, 
some aspects are particular for BRT under any development context. An important factor to take 
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into account in BRT implementation is that construction differs from that of rail transit projects 
(highly specialized, fewer interactions with as many urban streets) but also from road projects 
(lower precision, usually not though as part of a system).  
In the US, notable BRT projects have been implemented under the umbrella of an existing transit 
agency. They continue to be publicly owned and operated and are integrated with RBS and 
HRT/LRT, so many of the “agency creation” and “contrac ual agreements” mentioned here are 
irrelevant under the current institutional framework. 
 
3.3. BRT planning literature assessment 
 
In this chapter, two major planning guides were summarized and reviewed, along with other 
relevant literature. One (ITDP Planning Guide 2007) is more general and comprehensive in 
nature, touching almost every aspect of BRT planning possible, yet most of its content is more 
applicable to developing countries. A strong point of this guide is the contribution of 
international consultants who actually participated in the design and implementation of many 
successful systems, and thus bring unique insights and detailed case studies into the mix. Before 
this edition, the only existing version was one developed by the Sustainable Urban 
Transportation Project (SUTP) of the German Cooperation Agency (GTZ), which had some 
good technical information, but was not nearly as comprehensive and practical as the current 
guide. A weakness of this guide is that it is not compact enough for a practitioner to easily grasp 
the many iterative factors that affect BRT planning. 
The other (TCRP Report 118 Practitioner’s Guide) serves more as a quick reference guide, and is 
much more US-based. It misses many topics such as implementation and evaluation guidelines 
and impacts, but does a much better job at focusing on the characteristics of BRT and their 
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relationship to performance and to decision-making. It sees BRT under a much narrower focus: 
as a packaging of features that enhance current bus service, decreasing travel time and increasing 
ridership. Its methodologies are built on case studies from previous TCRP Reports 90, vols. 1: 
Case studies and 2: Implementation Guidelines (Levinson et al. 2003) and the Characteristics of 
BRT for Decision Making (2004, FTA), which at the time were good sources of reference but 
were weak in terms of implementation and decision-making. Thus, aside from papers giving 
recommendations for successful BRT planning (Levinson: 2003; Darrido, 2003), there were 
virtually no useful guides before 2007. Therefore, their publication was a major leap forward in 
BRT planning literature and so far nothing of relevance has been produced after. There has been 
no published feedback and their recent publication makes it is difficult to assess how useful they 
could be in practice.  
 
Since many of the case studies are either getting old and becoming less relevant in a modern 
BRT context, or reaching new stages of maturity, planning guidelines could benefit from newer 
case studies and a fresher look at their assessment that transcends basic metrics such as simple 
travel time savings benefits and busway local costs. This analysis approach would help 
determine clearly when a BRT system is successful, what are its strengths and weaknesses, and 
how to plan for optimum performance. The rest of this esis uses a case study approach to get 










The previous chapter looked at implementation from a planning standpoint, while this chapter 
focuses on the successes and problems of implementing different forms of BRT in different 
countries. The conclusions are based on an overall case study evaluation, using qualitative and 
quantitative comparisons. Issues are identified andrelated to the recommendations given in 
Chapter 3.   
 
4.2. State of Development 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, BRT gets implemented very quickly relative to other modes. This 
characteristic explains the rapid expansion of the industry around the world, especially in 
developing countries. Figure 1 shows a map of the current rapid transit systems (bus and rail- 
based) operating fully and their magnitude in terms of daily transported passengers.  Notice that 
rail systems (HRT, LRT, monorail) are still a majority in number but that BRT has a strong 
presence in the Americas, Asia, and Australia. The map also shows the countries within 





Figure 1.  Rapid Transit Systems by Mode 
 
 




Figure 2 shows the most relevant BRT systems in the world in terms of ridership and countries 
by level of human development using United Nations criteria. Even without normalizing for 
length and population, or modal share, the results clearly show that the utilization level of BRT 
systems in Latin America is consistently several orders or magnitude above the other regions. 
The only noticeable systems in terms of ridership in the developed world are in Nagoya (Japan) 
and Ottawa (Canada). Pittsburgh (USA) and Brisbane (Australia) are still worth mentioning as 
high ridership systems, but their service quality and capacity would have the potential or much 
higher patronage. This contrasts with systems like TransJakarta (Indonesia), which is a 
moderate-low quality BRT system but carries 10 times as many daily passengers as the O-Bahn 
(Adelaide), which has 5 times as much capacity.  This s ould not come as a surprise, since it is 
well known that developing countries have a much higher proportion of “captive riders”, but 
helps but into perspective the different BRT planning principles I have mentioned throughout 
this thesis.  
 
Despite this contrast, developing countries have been suffering from modal competition within 
low income travelers in the last 10 years, due to an exponential growth in motorcycle use. While 
that is not yet a direct problem with having sufficient transit demand, it can affect a systems’ cost 
effectiveness. In those with no significant subsidies, lower productivity could lead to higher 
fares, which would create a vicious cycle of increasing motorization. Therefore, the faster 
systems get implemented without compromising quality, the better chances of continued 


































In this regard, Figure 3 shows that BRT has been really a phenomenon of the last 10-15 years, 
since the Curitiba model evolved and was replicated. Rail based transit, on the other hand, has 
kept a linear growth since the late 1960’s. What the graph does not show is that within rail as a 
supra mode, LRT has been gaining more ground over HRT for two main reasons. First, most 
cities need to fill the gap between their high capacity, low coverage rail systems and their low 
capacity, high coverage regular bus service, which is most appropriate filled by a BRT-Lite or an 
LRT ( Vuchic, 2007). Second, the prohibitive costs of HRT has led to the popularization of 
LRRT, which is achieves similar service but at a lower cost. New HRT systems are rare, 
although they continue to be expanded for demand and political reasons, but a slow pace due to 
the relative high costs. Figures 4 and 5 better explain the real magnitude of rapid transit systems 
by showing not only their sheer number but the length of their exclusive right of way (EROW) 





BRT,  760.61 mi.
Rail,  4,608 mi .
 
Figure 4. Cumulative Exclusive Right of Way miles for Rapid Transit Systems 
 
BRT,  9,74 (M 
trips.day) 
Rail,  102 (M trips) 
 
Figure 5. Cumulative Daily Ridership for Rapid Transit Systems9 
 
                                                      
9 These figures do not take into account all of the systems shown in figure 3, only the ones for 
which both length and ridership data was found. While data was available for actual length and 






Figure 4 shows that BRTs are catching up with rail not only in system quantity but in coverage 
as well. One out of 10 exclusive right-of-way miles for transit in the world are now used by 
buses. This was unthinkable 10 years ago. Since most systems until the mid 1990s were based on 
busways, Figure 4 does not state but suggests that the growth in EROW miles has not been as 
fast as the growth in systems. This could be confirmed by the many BRT systems that include a 
significant portion of the trip in mixed lanes. This trend is mostly due to significant 
improvements in applying signal priority – most often seen in the US - , and phased 
implementation of BRT elements within an existing corridor, which usually occurs under budget 
constraints or political pressure. The greater flexibility of BRT with respect to LRT in 
transitioning from exclusive to mixed right-of-way for many branches becomes a disadvantage 
when implementers conform to a “bus improvements” concept. Another aspect of this trend is 
that the exponential growth rate in new systems - which should continue, since more systems are 
currently planned for the next decade than implemented in the last – is not indicative of their 
continued expansion. As it is observed later in this chapter, it seems easier to build new systems 
than to expand them. 
 
Figure 5 shows that BRT’s share of total ridership is similar to its share of total miles of Figure 
4. This results supports the argument that (albeit slight differences in IVTT unfavorable to BRT), 
BRT infrastructure carries just as many passengers as rails on a distance basis.  This thesis will 
not explore the productivity rates for different modes to dispel myths about their capacity, since 
that has already done before (Mohan, 2008), but it is a finding worth mentioning. As a final 
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observation, a slow system expansion could also be affecting the ridership-to-systems ratio. The 
next section will explore the practical reasons behind this issue, using case studies. 
 
 
4.3. Case study selection criteria 
 
What follows from this point on is a deeper look at the characteristics, performance, and 
implementation issues of related BRT systems. For this purpose, only systems that represent the 
higher part of a spectrum of BRT systems in terms of ystem components will be considered. A 
low threshold is set at the point where systems are not considered according to the definitions of 
BRT in Chapter 2. This classification will be determined by two metrics defined as the Bus 
Rapid Transit Classification Score (BRTCLASS) and the Coefficient of Variation of the Bus 
Rapid Transit Element Classification Score Share (CV – BRTECSS), which are based on the 














































The “percentage met” means how much of a certain BRT subcomponent the system is 
accomplishing, with each subcomponent having a maxium score  of 100 points (the 
“maxpoint”). Table 1 shows how both metrics are calculated. Note that for grade separation and 
TSP the points allocated vary. This variable scoring was included because both components are 
solutions to a similar problem. Table 2 shows how these translate into a meaningful 
classification. This is the classification used throughout this paper, since it is simple to define. 
However, the “Quickway” and “LRL” concepts defined by Cain and Hoffman (2008) are 
included for comparison purposes. 
 
Table 1. BRT Classification Worksheet 
 
Major elements Subcomponent % met Max Points Subscore Max. element score Element score share
% Exclusive X 17 = Σ Subscore
Grade separation X 5 to 8 =
% Passing @ stations X 5 =
Level Boarding X 10 = .
Access & Quality X 5 = .
Off board payment X 3 = .
Auto Payment X 2 =
Capacity Level X 10 =
Ease of access X 5 =
AVL w/Control X 7 =
User info system X 4 =
Guidance X 2 =
TSP X 2 to 5 =
Closed system X 10 =
Multiple corridors X 3 =
Multiple routes X 2 =
Modally integrated X 5 =
BRTCLASS = Σ

















Table 2. BRT Interpretation of Classification Metrics 
 
Metric Name BRT Range Description
0 to 30 RBS No noticeable improvements
30 to 60 Pre BRT Busways or Bus Improvements
60 to 80 Basic BRT BRT Lite or BST 
80 to 100 Premium BRT High Level, true rapid transit
Element Balance Description
0 to 0.2 High Higher element synergies
0.2 to 0.4 Medium Usually one major deficiency







The scoring methodology is not designed to be a performance evaluation metric (i.e. 
performance based on needs, component synergies, and user experience), but is reliable enough 
to accurately classify BRT systems. It also serves as an example to show the relationship 
between characteristics and performance. While the latt r sometimes fails to reflect the former, 
usually an evaluation of characteristics like this method gives a good idea of how the system can 
perform. 
That is why performance is relaxed as a criterion fr classification purposes, since assessing it 
based on actual implementation is precisely what will be done once the systems are chosen. 
Other practical aspects about choosing a case studyare considered, such as data availability and 
age of system. The summary of the checklist used to cho se the BRT system cases is shown in 








Table 3. BRT Case Selection Checklist 
 
      
 No.      BRT Case Study Selection Criteria 
 
 
     Met? 
 






2. In operation for one year or more before data 















5. Is the case study unique enough in terms of 




Using this methodology, 20 of the most well known “BRT” systems were classified. Out of 
these, 13 fulfilled the selection criteria (see Table 4). Brisbane Busways, which is arguably a 
premium BRT system, suffers from the limitations of the method. Otherwise, the scores reflect 
qualitative descriptions. The systems left out of the case study analyses are all Asian and 
European systems. The Asian systems were left out because all but Beijing’s had a score lower 
than 60. An exception could have been made for Jakarta, which comes just short of making the 
list, but is continuously improving and was the first system (the latest is in Lagos, Nigeria) in 
Asia that tried to make a lighter version of Transmilenio. TransJakarta’s implementation issues 
were studied by Hidalgo (2008) and Wright and Hook (2007) and make a good case study 
because they show what “not to do” in BRT planning. Classic mistakes in design - small buses 
50 
 
with few doors, small stations, and open were made during the first phase. If the scoring method 
used here had been applied to the system in 2004, it would have scored much lower. 
The challenge is that the data needed for the type of analysis performed later in this chapter was 
not able to be collected - as happened with the two European systems - so no more than a 
summary of a case study could have been provided. Also, since its problems are clearly 
identifiable, it is no longer as relevant for people not familiar with BRT planning. More 
interesting are systems that are arguably successful, but are facing challenges to maintain or 
improve their success. Finally, to put things into a geographic perspective, Table 5 shows that 
most established BRT systems fit the “basic” designatio , and that all “premium” BRT systems 
are located in Latin America----not surprising, since this is where the concept was invented. 
Figure 6 shows this on a map and, not surprisingly as well, shows that “premium” BRT systems 
correlate well with the high ridership systems observed in Figure 2.  
 
Table 4. BRT Scoring, Classification and Selection 




Transmilenio Bogota Latin America 90 Premium BRT 0.11 High "Quickway" Complete system
Ecovia/Trole/CN Quito Latin America 69 Basic BRT 0.40 Medium Light Rail Lite Not Integrated
Sistema Integrado Curitiba Latin America 84 Premium BRT 0.21 Medium Hybrid Integrated, needs upgrade
Interligado Sao Paulo Latin America 77 Basic BRT 0.24 Medium "Quickway" Low Tech (ITS)
Transantiago Santiago Latin America 76 Basic BRT 0.24 Medium "Quickway" Infrastructure Deficient
Metrobus Mexico D.F. Latin America 88 Premium BRT 0.16 High "T-Way" Limiting Infrastructure
TEOR Rouen Western Europe 68 Basic BRT 0.34 Medium Light Rail Lite Infrastructure Deficient
Zuidtangent Amsterdam Western Europe 76 Basic BRT 0.23 Medium Light Rail Lite Infrastructure Deficient
Transitway Ottawa Anglo America 69 Basic BRT 0.37 Medium "Quickway" Low Tech (ITS + Stations)
Silver Line Boston Anglo America 70 Basic BRT 0.16 High Hybrid Limiting Infrastructure
Busway Miami Anglo America 62 Basic BRT 0.37 Medium "Quickway" Very Low Tech (ITS + Stations)
South/West/MLK Pittsburgh Anglo America 63 Basic BRT 0.57 Low "Quickway" Extremely Low Tech (All)
Orange Line Los Angeles Anglo America 64 Basic BRT 0.31 Medium "T-Way" (LRL) Stations: weakest element
O-bahn Adelaide Australia 76 Basic BRT 0.34 Medium "T-Way" Stations: weakest element
SE Busway Brisbane Australia 75 Basic BRT 0.33 Medium "Quickway" Stations: weakest element
Minquan BRT Taipei East Asia 49 Pre BRT 0.42 Low Light Rail Lite Station-weak, not a system
Median Bus Lanes Seoul East Asia 46 Pre BRT 0.40 Low Light Rail Lite Highly Infrastructure Deficient
Bus Improvements Beijing East Asia 76 Basic BRT 0.24 Medium Light Rail Lite User-experience deficiencies
Bus Lanes Kunming East Asia 37 Pre BRT 0.55 Low Light Rail Lite Just a busway
Transjakarta Jakarta Southeast Asia 57 Pre BRT 0.34 Medium "T-Way" Low Tech, Mediocre Design
Does not meet Criterion 1





Table 5. Number of BRT systems evaluated 
 
Region       Premium BRT Basic BRT Pre BRT RBS All types
Latin America 3 3 0 0 6
Western Europe 0 2 0 0 2
Anglo America 0 5 0 0 5
Australia 0 2 0 0 2
East Asia 0 1 3 0 4
Southeast Asia 0 0 1 0 1
All Regions 3 13 4 0 20  
 
 









This section summarizes the implementation of the 13 systems by comparing key characteristics 
and identifying current issues. In doing so, the objective is to understand the reasons behind the 
systems characteristics and performance from a qualitative perspective. By giving a context to 
the systems, the subsequent quantitative analysis should be easier to interpret.  
 
4.4.1. Context  
 
When a new transit mode emerges, a complex problem arises. Its continued success depends on 
how it is perceived. Its image greatly depends on the performance of the first few systems that 
get implemented, and especially, their initial performance. Yet this initial performance suffers 
more compared to other, more established modes, since there is little experience to draw upon. 
And if on top of that, the financial constraints and political pressure for rushed implementation 
that are common in many developing countries are added, chances for success could be very 
limited. If a major failure occurs, then the industry’s modal momentum could be stymied for 
decades. However, from a more optimistic perspectiv, hese constraints can be used positively 
to come up with creative, more cost-effective soluti ns. Given low quality RBS preceding a BRT 
system and high transit ridership captivity can lead to more satisfied users. All of these 
conditions presented themselves in South America at a point in time a little more than a decade 
ago and thus high capacity, fully-featured, premium BRT was born in Bogotá. Before then, 
notable examples of proto-BRT had been implemented: O-bahn, in Adelaide, Australia; 
Transitway, in Ottawa, Canada; and RIT, in Curitiba, Brazil. Quito had previously copied some 
of Curitiba’s elements, but the system was quite incomplete at the beginning. So, while these 
were systems that are now effectively BRT, at the time they did not have all the elements 
required to fit the modern definition; or if they did, they  were not considered a distinctive mode, 
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since they evolved slowly over time, adapting to loca  conditions. Upon Transmilenio’s success 
in Bogotá, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) played an important role in promoting this 
combination of elements as characteristic of a new mode, the first true rapid transit with rubber 
tires running on concrete.  After that, different economic, spatial, institutional, and cultural 
conditions have made the mode’s establishment and maturation perhaps more difficult than 
expected, despite BRT’s popularity. More than difficult, these conditions created an unexpected 
divergence in scope and quality. In scope, there is the now the well known distinction between 
“LRL” and “Quickway” and their “siblings”. In quality, many systems around the world, 
especially those in Asia, have copied successful Soth American BRTs very poorly.  
While the case studies are not representative of this wide range of systems since only the highest 
performing were chosen, their history tells us much about the development of a new mode. Part 
of their “incremental implementation” and ”ease and speed of implementation”, which can be 
huge advantages, are also their Achilles heels, especially when past experience is not applied and 
quality control is inadequate.  
4.4.2. Assessment 
 
Table 6 shows the many factors that affected the imple entation of the chosen case studies, how 
decision-making took place, and how these translated into performance, evaluated from a broad, 
qualitative perspective. Function refers to the place and structure of the system: back--bone, 
which is basically a trunk-route oriented system that is the major mass transit mode; 
comprehensive, which means that different levels of BRT cover the whole city; and 





Table 6. Relationship between urban conditions, implementation, and outcome. 
System










impacts (+ or -)
Transmilenio, Bogotá Large High Medium Multiple Corridors* Backbone Intramodal Incremental, Outward Top-Down Cost Slow Good Medium
Metrobús-Q, Quito Medium High Medium-Low Corridor Backbone None Unclear Top-Down Cost Moderate Fair Medium
RIT, Curitiba Medium High Medium-High City-wide Comprehensive Intramodal
Incremental, 
Bidirirectional Top-Down Cost Moderate Excellent High




integration Moderate Fair High
Transantiago, Santiago Large Very High Medium-High City-wide Complementary Total Simultaneous Bottom-Up
Multimodal 
integration N/A Fair High
Metrobus, Mexico D.F. Very Large Very High Medium Multiple Corridors Complementary Total (P) Incremental, Outward Bottom-Up Cost Moderate Very Good Low
Transitway, Ottawa Medium Low High Single Corridor Backbone Intermodal Unclear Bottom-Up Cost Slow Good Medium
Silver Line , Boston Large Medium High Multiple Corridors Complementary Limited Incremental, Inward Bottom-Up Cost Slow Fair Low
SMD Busway -Mbus, Miami Large Medium High Single Corridor Complementary Intramodal Unclear Bottom-Up Cost Slow Fair Low
Busways, Pittsburgh Medium Low High Multiple Corridors Backbone Total (P) Incremental, Outward Bottom-Up Cost Slow Good Low
Orange Line, Los Angeles Very Large Low High Single Corridor Complementary Intermodal Incremental, Inward Bottom-Up Cost Slow Very Good Low
O-bahn, Adelaide Medium Low High Single Corridor Complementary Intermodal (P) Incremental Bottom-Up Public Choice Slow Very Good Low
Busways, Brisbane Medium Low High Multiple Corridors Complementary Intermodal
Incremental, 
Bidirirectional Bottom-Up Cost Moderate Very Good Medium
Decision-Making Sustained OutcomeUrban Area Characteristics System Planning and Implementation Approach
 
Source. Latin American Systems (Hidalgo, 2008). Rest from FTA (2003), and reporting agencies. 
 
Curitiba is unique in this sense given its gradual and successful implementation that benefited 
from a strong land-use connection. Other cities have integrated the entire public transportation 
system, including BRT (Santiago and Sao Paulo, which have a “city-wide” scale), but the 
barriers between modes make them only complementary. Their scale of application makes them 
different types of systems similar to Transmilenio, which in its vision for the future has higher 
coverage, but in practice only covers a segment of the city through multiple corridors.  
A third dimension is called integration, which considers how well the system integrates with like 
modes and other modes. Finally, the expansion strategy tells about the dynamics of the other 
three variables. First, if the system expands incrementally or results from a simultaneous, “big 
bang” approach; second, if it displaces other modes and captures the market (outward), or if it is 
build by segments, complementing other modes (inward). If expansion goes in both directions, 
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which occurs only for well-integrated transportation, then the strategy can be called bi-
directional.  
This complex implementation approach, which depends on the many characteristics of a city and 
on the implementers, is carried on through different decision-making processes, mainly top-
down or bottom-up. The first generally describes a process led by a strong major or other 
political figure that expedites the implementation process by having a large degree of control and 
little public involvement. The second describes a process that can also start at a government 
level, but is a more rational, pluralistic decision making process, or starts from the community 
and builds a consensus over time. A top-down approach is more common and effective in 
developing countries, especially in the short term, while a bottom-up approach may slow things 
down at the beginning, but tends to work better in more developed democracies. The modal 
choice, whether it is through a sophisticated alternatives analysis or the personal preference of 
the Mayor, usually ends up being made due to cost, modal bias, or in a more extensive network, 
the need for it to bridge the gap between local and ultra-fast service. 
Finally, the table relates the contextual, implementation and decision making characteristics of 
the case studies to long term performance. Performance is expressed in terms of expansion 
speed, which is very important for the city’s and mode’s future; general performance, which is a 
qualitative assessment of how well the system operates from a user’s perspective; and large scale 
impacts, such as the mitigation of city-wide congestion and emissions.  
Putting everything together, it can be observed in ge eral terms that higher scales and more 
inclusive integration tend to have the largest impacts at moderate expansion speeds. City size, 
density and economic development do not correlate well ith sustained outcomes. This result 
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tentatively confirms the concept of the wide urban character range under which BRT is 
competitive.  
Overall, all the systems are expanding at much slower rates than predicted. This affects all public 
transportation modes and should not come as a surpri e. Perhaps then, one of the major 
advantages indicated by the original BRT literature, implementation speed, should only be 
interpreted as construction speed, because overall system implementation speed through 
expansion, even with higher capital cost effectiveness, is not that much higher than for rail.  
Implementing BRT might be cheaper and easier if the infrastructure is partially in place, but it is 
still not simple. Looking at the origins of the 13 systems analyzed explains it better. Table 7 
shows how most systems failed to have their technology in place when operations were supposed 
to start. This could be attributed to political pressure and inexperience in some cases. The main 
other reason was most likely underestimating the complexity of the BRT’s implementation due 
to the “bus” nature of the system.  
 
Not only was the advanced technology not ready (after all the system ccould work without it),  
but something as basic as the number and type of buses was wrongly provided. Again, this 
happened for financial constraints in Santiago, but in most cases usually occurred because of late 
procurement. This situation occurred more in Latin American, not only because of a 
“procrastinating culture,” but because of the multiple firms owning the buses. From a 
geographical perspective, systems in the highly developed, Anglo-speaking countries tended to 
perform better. Australia, in particular, implementd their systems better from the beginning, and 
still get some of the best press of all the systems studied.  
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The implementation analysis now moves on to the costs and revenues structure under which the 
BRT systems operated. This system breakdown is shown in Table 8.  
 




Infrastructure Buses Stations -  FC ITS -C. Control Information Ridership IVTT Acceptance






High for users, low for 
existing operators
Trolebús, Quito 1995 Poor Quality Insufficient Coin N/A Scarce Moderate growth Moderate decrease
Average for users, low 
for existing operators




High among users and 
existing operators
Passá-Rapido, Sao Paulo 2003 OK Old-new mix Problems No C. c ntrol
Sufficient but 
ineffective
Small growth Small decrease
Average for users and 
existing operators
Transantiago, Santiago 2007 Incomplete Insufficient Not operational Not ready Scarce
Major Decrease 
(Diverted)
Small decrease Major rejection 
Metrobus Insurgentes, Mexico 
D.F.
2005 Incomplete Arrived late Paper Not ready Scarce
Moderate Absolute 
Growth
High decrease High for users
Transitway, Ottawa 1983 Good Small Manual -onboard N/A Moderate growth Moderate decrease High for users
Silver Line Washington St, 
Boston
2004 OK Insufficient Manual -onboard, OK Problems Sufficient High growth Moderate decrease High for users
SMD Busway, Miami 1997 Good condition Small Manual -onbard N/A
High ( moderate 
absolute growth)








O-bahn, Adelaide 1986 Good condition Adequate Manual -onboard N/A
High ( moderate 
absolute growth)
High decrease
High for users and 
operators
SE Busway, Brisbane 2001 Good condition Adequate Manual -onboard Ready Sufficient
High ( moderate 
absolute growth)
Moderate decrease
High for users and 
operators
Immediate Outcomes/Impacts onOriginal System Characteristics 
 
Source. Latin American Systems (Hidalgo, 2008). Rest from FTA (2003), and reporting agencies. 
 
 
Table 8. Revenue management structure and policy 
System Operating Costs and Revenues
Name and Location Operational Subsidy Level Formula Ad-hoc Direct Negotiation
Competitive 
Tendering
Transmilenio, Bogotá None X X
Metrobús-Q, Quito Low X X
RIT, Curitiba None X
Interligado, Sao Paulo Low X
Transantiago, Santiago Low X X
Metrobus, Mexico D.F. Very Low X
Transitway, Ottawa Medium X N/A N/A
Silver Line , Boston High X N/A N/A
SMD Busway -Mbus, Miami High X N/A N/A
Busways, Pittsburgh Medium X N/A N/A
Orange Line, Los Angeles High X N/A N/A
O-bahn, Adelaide High X X
Busways, Brisbane Medium X X






Operating costs tend to be high in developed countries due to high labor costs, leading to 
subsidized operations. However, the level of subsidy varies. Australian and North American 
systems tend to have high subsidies. Also, Australians are more willing to experiment with 
contracting out services, a practice Americans largely abandoned or limited with purchased 
transportation such as for paratransit. 10 There are many types of contracting practices, but 
competitive tendering and direct negotiation are thmost common, and the success of each 
depends more on local conditions. Yet competitive tendering tends to work better when technical 
fares are market-calibrated.  
Fare structure varied in developing countries betwen contractually provided usually through a 
formula based on service effectiveness11 (metric explored in the next section of this thesis) or ad-
hoc, ranging from pure electoral to social policy to financial distress. Developed countries 
mostly set their fares in an ad-hoc manner due to financial distress, but they maintain  high 
subsidy levels for social policy and transit patronage reasons. This is the ad-hoc setting of a fare, 
due to financial trouble is what has happened in the US in the past year, when most agencies 
raised their fares as one of the many measures to close their increased revenue gap in FY 2009.  
 
Ideally, fares should be determined technically with some market freedom allowing for 
innovation to at least cover operating costs, a very difficult goal in practice. However, BRT as a 
competitive mode in terms of costs and of promoting regulated competition for the market shows 
                                                      
10
 In the US, private involvement in public transportation in terms of funding and operating tends to be different in 
southern States.  
11
 Currently, the Latin American model implements “pay-by-km” for operators. This has shown to be more 
beneficial than the However, experience and theory has also shown that a combination of both is more 
economically efficient and that is currently piloted in Curitiba. 
59 
 
cities in countries of various levels of development a d market-friendliness that public transport 






Table 9. Success and Problems in BRT systems for different aspects 
Successes Problems Successes Problems Successes Problems Successes Problems
Transmilenio, Bogotá High capacity
Crowding at buses and 
stations
Pays for itself








Faster and more 
comfortable service
High fares
Metrobús-Q, Quito Low emissions
Not integrated, poor 
feeder service No clear institutional 
independence Low fares, faster IVTT High transfer times
RIT, Curitiba Transit hierarchy Inefficient operations Generates profit Strong authority
Competitive with auto Crowding
Interligado, Sao Paulo Intermodal integration Lane invasions Pays for itself
Unclear revenue 
management Centralized decision 
making, low pubic input Seamless integration Unreliable travel times
Transantiago, Santiago High coverage Insufficient fleet Funding guaranteed




Faster than before High transfer times
Metrobus, Mexico D.F. Efficient operations
Not enough capacity for 
demand
Strong funding support Still needs subsidies
High degree of agency 
independency 
Unfair intermodal 
competition Much faster than auto in 
corridor, good quality Crowding
Transitway, Ottawa
Good capacity and 
coverage
Poor design downtown, 
Bus bunching at peak
Costs less than rail to 
build.





Good coverage, few 
transfers
Silver Line , Boston
Modern fleet and 
infrastructure
Low reliability
Expansion not approved 
for Federal Funding
Had strong support from 
FTA for first two phases
No strong backing 
outside MBTA for 
Phase III
Better than routes 
displaced Not as good as subway
SMD Busway -Mbus, Miami Fast
Design leads to crashes, 
long headways
Costs less than rail to 
build. Effective as feeder 
service
Its own feeders 
problematic
Busways, Pittsburgh Multiple routes Inefficient operations




Orange Line, Los Angeles Good use of TSP
Not enough capacity for 
demand, high crash rate, 
pavement issues
Costs less than rail to 
build and operate Serves crucial 
destinations
Perceived by some as 
unsafer and lower quaity 
than rail
O-bahn, Adelaide Very fast, Guided Insufficient integration
Costs less than rail to 
build and operate
Implemented successful 
operations contracting Very fast, great option 
for suburbans
Not enough integration at 
stations.




Problems with access at 
stations, fare collection
User PerspectiveSystem Name and 
Location
Design and Operational Costs/Financial Institutional
 
 
Finally, the qualitative evaluation ends with a summary of the assessment of BRT 
implementation through design and operations, costs and finances, institutional and user 






Every system faces challenges, but Curitiba’s and Brisbane’s systems seem a step above the rest. 
Judging from previous discussions, it should not come as a surprise.  For the other systems, the 
most recurrent operational problem is crowding either at stations or buses. The lower the “value-
of-comfort”, the easier it is to maintain these levels without having a significant drop in 
ridership, so the issue is often overlooked in preference for higher profits. There is also major 
room for improvement in system integration and operational productivity gains. In terms of 
costs, funding, and finance, the cases show that BRT is competitive, but not at the same level 
that was promoted 8 years ago.  On the other side, there is another mismatch between the users’ 
perspective and costs. As discussed before, some cities often sacrifice revenues for increased 
user satisfaction, either for political or social benefit reasons.  
In the end, institutional and political barriers should not be overlooked, since these could be one 
important reason for BRT being less successful thanexpected. Despite showing good impacts 
and performance, political support for it is often weak as compared to rail transit.  
 
Judging from this evaluation, BRT has become a significa t mode not only in terms of size, but 
performance as well. Its main problem is that putting together all of its characteristic elements in 
a way that achieves high performance at minimum cost ha  been proven to be more difficult than 
thought. This is because the system, flexible as itis, must adapt to local conditions, and often this
is not done in the system optimal way. Yet the mode is relatively new to have a large room for 
improvement. So far, systems have been implemented mostly on a trial-and-error basis, with 
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several missing elements: limited overall assessment, b chmarking, and a theoretical foundation 
for planning, design and operations. Hopefully, this thesis has provided some guidance on how 
these elements can be improved. The next step is to show a quantitative assessment. 
 
4.5. Quantitative Evaluation12 
 
So far, BRT performance has been presented in terms of categories, since that approach makes it 
easier to interpret complex data. Once such analysis has been been able to pinpoint key issues, it 
is important to complement it with quantitative analysis. To meet this need, a series of key 
performance indicators (KPI) were applied based on available data. Data availability is poor 
relative to other fields, so the analysis is somewhat limited in scope, detail and reliability, yet 
offers substantial information regarding BRT performance. Indicators are ordered by: operations, 
cost, and access.  Some of these tell us more about the supply side (i.e., the service provider 
perspective) while others describe better the demand side (i.e., user experience perspective).  The 
measures used in this analysis are not categorized as such because the overall picture of system 




The first indicator shown is “peak load,” which is the maximum observed in-vehicle passenger 
flow at a point along the route (i.e., a station). This is not to be confused with capacity, which is 
the theoretical value of the maximum flow that the facility can hold. Figure 7 shows the values 
                                                      
12
 Otherwise noted, data comes from: Hidalgo et al. (2008, 2008b, FTA, Transmilenio, Translink, Transantiago, CTS-
Mexico, OC Transpo, ITDP, TRB, and MBTA. 
62 
 
for the 13 systems and what is striking is the variability. While the qualitative evaluation showed 
the systems more evenly paired - a valid assessment - this figure shows how much they differ in 
this important metric.  
















Figure 7. Peak load. Bogotá show in red (or lighter color) 
 
 
Throughout the thesis, it has been mentioned that one of BRT’s main strengths is that it can carry 
as many passengers as many of the highest ridership rail systems in the world. This claim is 
mostly due to Transmilenio, since it broke all paradigms of mode-capacity constraints by 
utilizing 4 lanes at stations (and sometimes for longer segments) providing various degrees of 
limited stops along a line. Thus, this station capaity is achieved due to the system’s service 
flexibility, more than its vehicles’ speed and capacity, as happens with heavy rail systems. While 
the value means the same for the agency, it has different implications on the type of service 
provided and the user experience.  
One aspect of user experience related to peak load is how crowded the bus is. While 
Transmilenio’s famous 43.000 pax/veh-dir was measured with buses in excess of 160 
passengers, in the US a bus the same size cannot hold more than 120. From the agency’s 
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perspective, achieving such capacities is only important if there is demand for it. Many of these 
systems carry fewer passengers per day than TM in a peak-hour in one direction. The absolute 
number of vehicle capacity is important, but in terms of service quality and efficiency, more 
important is the relationship between peak load and capacity. 














Peak Load/ Theoretical Capacity (%) 
 
Figure 8. Ratio of Peak load to Estimated Capacity (systems at or near capacity in red). 
 
 
Figure 8 shows this relationship through a ratio. Nn-reported capacity was estimated by looking 
at the station with the highest ridership potential and making assumptions on traffic saturation 
rate. Aside from current station design, current fleet was also considered. Passenger capacity was 
calculated using maximum design levels for bus capaity based on each country’s regulations. 
That is why Metrobús presents higher load than capacity, since it probably was holding more 
than 150 passengers per 18m bus. What is most important f om this figure is that all systems in 
developing countries are operating at capacity except Santiago, which is just recovering from its 
implementation problems and could thus be considered an outlier. However, systems such as the 
Boston’s Silver Line, Ottawa’s Transitway, and Brisbane’s South Busway also present good 
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ratios. On the other hand, a system like Adelaide is sub-utilizing its capacity, but as will be 
shown later, at the expense of high speeds. 
Next is a very important measure of cost effectiveness: operational productivity. Figure 9 shows 
this value for the 13 systems. 
 
















Figure 9. Operational Productivity. Data unavailable for Santiago. 
 
 
Operational productivity is a key measure because it t lls how efficiently a transit system is 
operating. It is easy to interpret because it basically means how many passenger boardings on 
average occupy a bus per unit of distance traveled. In the operating contracts in Bogota and 
Santiago, it is one of the most important variables affecting the fare. The higher the value, the 
better the system should be. However, from the user’s perspective, a very high productivity 
could be detrimental in the case of bus and station cr wding, with passengers often missing their 
trips. This low level of service is often not address d and a larger focus is put on the agency’s 
performance measures. Figure 9 shows that Transmilenio has a low productivity with respect to 
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the average, and the main reason is that it operates almost empty on parts of the route. This could 
be easily improved with relatively inexpensive infrastructure improvements. 
One performance measure that directly affects users i  the commercial speed of the service. This 
represents the average speed, including stops, of a set of buses running through a corridor or 
system.  
 




















Figure 10 compares this speed for the thirteen system . All speeds in developing countries fall 
within the 10 to 18 mph range, while developed countries tend to show higher speeds. 
Commercial speed depends on many factors, especially the number of and distance between 
stops along a route. In terms of BRT elements, higher speeds result from highly segregated 
infrastructure, including grade separation at intersections. As developed countries usually have 
grade separation (or at least traffic signal priority) and long spacing between stations, their 
speeds are on average higher than in developing countries, where stations are closer together, 
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lanes are often at grade, and no TSP is included. Nonetheless, in systems like Transmilenio, there 
are express services in which speeds are much higher than the average.  
Dwell times also affect speed significantly. Dwell times for TM are 67% higher than in the 
Transitway or the Orange Line, which shows a tradeoff between speed and load. Finally, while 
commercial speed is important, focusing on it by itself is useless. The higher the access and 
connectivity of a system, the less important it becomes. Adelaide is remarkable in that it achieves 






Another set of performance indicators relates primarily to cost, and especially the cost efficiency 
and effectiveness of a system. From the operator’s per pective, capital productivity is very 
important since it tells how efficiently the bus fleet is used. Figure 11 shows the values for the 
case studies. Although from a service effectiveness perspective Bogota’s system needs 
improvement (Figure 9), in terms of how efficiently the fleet is utilized, it ranks high, along with 
Mexico City. Systems in developed countries struggle more with making the most out of their 
fleets, since they need to have a sufficient fleet size to provide a desired level of service. Peak-
off peak patterns could be affecting these values too, so a dimensionless ratio of the average 
hourly ridership on the busiest line to the maximum hourly ridership on a segment would 
represent how intensively the fleet is being used. Data was not sufficient for all systems to 
























Capital productivity considers fleet usage, but notthe costs of operation or the cost of the 
infrastructure. Another measure of capital cost effectiveness is the annualized cost per passenger, 
which can be interpreted as a subsidy. It is the ratio of the annualized payments of the system’s 
infrastructure costs in PV (2008) to the number of passenger boardings per year. If the 
annualized operating costs are added and the annualized revenues per passenger are subtracted 
from this value, the annualized subsidy results. To calculate the annualized capital cost, a 20 year 
life was assumed, since the durability and permanence of BRT is still debated, and the discount 
rate assumed 5% for US systems and applied a risk premium for the rest. Ridership was assumed 
constant for the built infrastructure. The results are shown in Figure 12, which shows that the 
variability between annualized costs per passenger is xtremely high. Also notice that there is a 
noticeable difference between developed and underdev loped countries, although Sao Paulo and 
Adelaide are very similar, and Ottawa is very similar to Bogotá. 
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Annualized cost per pax ($/pax-yr)
 
Figure 12. Annualized capital cost per passenger 
 
 
Figure 12 shows that the variability between annualized costs per passenger is extremely high. 
Also notice that there is a noticeable difference between developed and underdeveloped 
countries, although Sao Paulo and Adelaide are verysimilar, and Ottawa is very similar to 
Bogotá. Ottawa is special because it has the highest ridership of all developed countries, and its 
costs could be underestimated given it was built many years ago and many of the costs could 
have been misrepresented in current dollars. Boston and Miami represent situations where 
systems are not cheap, even when they are portrayed s such. Boston made an enormous 
investment in its Waterfront line for only minimal levels of ridership, and it is doubtful that its 
benefits will ever justify this investment. Perhaps this result has contributed to putting Phase III 
on hold. Miami had a high cost because a busway was built almost from scratch to serve a low 
number of passengers. These results are important, because they show that BRT per se is not an 
inexpensive mode. It is competitive when the right of way is available for use, but when 
extensive new grade separation investments and transfer facilities are needed, and unless the 
system carries very high volumes, BRT loses its comparative advantage in terms of capital costs 
per rider.  
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Values for operating cost effectiveness are not available for most systems, so a comparative 
graph is not presented, but the available data show that BRT is indeed competitive in terms of 
operational cost even when service effectiveness (Figure 9) is not very high. Since RBS is much 
less efficient, the numbers favor BRT. While the MBTA reports a 40% farebox recovery ratio 
(NTD, 2008), the number is closer to 70% for the Silver Line, as the average trip costs only 
$1.25. Pittsburgh, which also has a light rail line, r ports $2.73 per trip for its West Busway, 
higher than for its LRT, and a $1.02 average for its East Busway, lower than its LRT (FTA, 
2009; NTD, 2008). In Adelaide, costs are much higher, but an average busway trip is subsidized 
by 2.9 AUD compared to 8.8 AUD for the rail system13. This lower subsidy compared to rail 
could in fact be affected by the competitive tendering process that took place when contracting 
bus operations. 
 Finally, Latin American systems are known to have th  capability to “break even”, since their 
labor costs are much lower even in more developed cities like Curitiba and Santiago, and the 
ridership is so high. Bogotá has relatively high cost perations due to its low service 
effectiveness, while Mexico City and Quito take advntage of their high effectiveness to lower 
their fares. These services are subsidized, but not significantly. 
 
 Regarding fares, it is important to illustrate them from the users’ perspective. Since income 
levels vary largely across the cities studied, fares should be normalized by median income in 
order to determine their impact on users. Figure 13 shows the share of fare–to-income. 
                                                      
13
 Source: Wikipedia. Retrieved October 6, 2010. 
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From this perspective, values are not as different from region to region, although North 
American systems tend to have lower shares due to a combination of heavy subsidies and high 
incomes. Although people do not perceive the money th pay in taxes the same as they would 
pay with a token, most are aware of the subsidy. Curitiba shows the highest value, yet it remains 
competitive because of the high level of integration of its system. The fare is relatively high, but 
the system generates profits that go to reinvestment, and its impacts on urban form and quality of 
life are so noticeable, and contrasts so much with the congested streets, that people are willing to 
pay the fare.  
 
Figure 14 looks at fares from a different perspectiv : the purchasing power and how it compares 
to the travel time cost, since passengers base their travel decision on the combination of both. 
This comparison allows us to put into perspective the fare across cities.  
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Fare 2009 (PPP) Time user cost (PPP)
 
Figure 14. Fare and travel time cost for 5 mi trip, normalized by purchasing power. 
 
 
Travel time cost was estimated for a 5 mile trip with no transfers, and a quarter-mile walking 
distance to a station. This cost is seen to be significa t, similar to the fare or exceeding it in most 
cities, except in Bogota, Quito, Adelaide and Brisbane.  Fares can be inelastic even for non-
captive riders with increasing congestion.  This could make it attractive for transit agencies to 
raise fares, if income equity is not considered. Investment in fully featured BRT systems could 
bring large benefits, and fares could be increased to reasonable levels if social benefits occur. 
4.5.3 Access 
 
Access is a complex concept that considers variables such as coverage, connectivity, and equity. 
A first approach in understanding the BRT system’s i pacts on the cities they serve is to look at 
how many people they effectively serve. Figure 15 shows the share of daily trips to population. 
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This is not equivalent to the share of population using transit since people make a different 
number of trips every day.14 Yet it gives an order of magnitude estimate of how large and 
effective is the system. The results are not surprising given what has been discussed in this 
chapter. The top performing systems have a relativey high share, which also depends on the 
function of the system described earlier in the chapter. Ottawa stands out within North American 
systems, since BRT is the main mass transit mode in this small, low density city. Mexico DF has 
a great system, but by 2009 only had two lines while the subway had eleven. 
 




















Another way to look at coverage is from a spatial pers ective. If we assume a transit supportive 
area and a BRT service area based on TCQSM (2003) criteria, we can come up with a ratio 
called THEMP (Theoretical Market Penetration). Figure 16 shows the results of calculating this 
new metric. 
 
                                                      
14
 The increased use of smartcards allow for a clearer distinction between trips and riders. 
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Figure 16. System coverage by theoretical service are  
 
 
The figure shows that systems where BRT is the most important mode of mass transit already 
cover a significant amount of the metropolitan area and, in theory, the population. Using both 
Figures 15 and 16 one sees that Transmilenio consists of only 52 of the proposed 242 miles 
(21%), and covers 30% of the theoretical transit supportive area. It is expected that with 
increased expansion, the marginal coverage will decrease, but connectivity will increase.   
 
To better understand how coverage interacts with population and space, another metric was 
developed, called the CII (Coverage Intensity Index). This index is the ratio of the share of 
transit trips made on BRT to the THEMP. It is basiclly the ratio of the real versus theoretical 
modal share. A value of one would represent equal attractiveness of BRT with respect to other 
modes. The index has its limitations, especially when the transit network is intermodally well 





Figure 17. System coverage by BRT intensiveness 
 
 
Ceteris paribus, Figure 17 suggests that systems that suffer from competition in the market with 
other bus systems (e.g. Bogotá, Quito, Mexico) fareless well than others who are either the 
dominant mode (e.g. Curitiba, Ottawa), or well integrated with other modes. The results are 





This review, performed from both qualitative and quantitative perspectives, has largely agreed 
with previous literature in that it shows bus rapid transit as a relevant mode in a universal context 
that has not yet fulfilled its potential. Yet this study complements that literature by looking at 
some of the most representative BRT systems in the world and assessing them through objective 




• Bus Rapid Transit is in fact a distinctive mode. A popular opinion within a large 
community including practitioners is that the name is just a rebranding used by the FTA 
and transit lobbyists to describe minor improvements i  bus transit. That opinion is 
wrong; BRT describes a bundle of characteristics that make it fundamentally different to 
the still important local bus service (RBS in this thesis). These characteristics come in 
two forms: elements and interaction between them. A focus on just the elements does not 
necessarily constitute BRT. Despite BRT being part of a quasi-continuous range of bus 
transit, the discontinuity takes place when reliabity and speed are significantly 
improved, and flexibility and direct access are signif cantly reduced.  
 
• Bus Rapid Transit is cost-competitive, even in highly developed economies.  
Due to its service pattern, BRT can compensate its labor cost disadvantage with high 
productivities that allow it to be competitive under most economic and network size 
conditions. 
 
• Bus Rapid Transit implementation is more complex and usually slower than originally 
thought. According to the special characteristics of BRT, in order to make it cost 
efficient, effective, and rapid, important decisions in terms of element design and 
implementation strategies need to be well defined with enough time. Otherwise, problems 
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